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1Chapter
Neurophenomenology, Enaction, 
and Autopoïesis
John Stewart
Abstract
The project of neurophenomenology, initiated by Francisco Varela, aims at 
establishing correlations between descriptions of lived experience (as elicited by the 
explicitation interview technique) and brain states (as measured with increasing 
precision and detail by the new brain imaging techniques). However, on their own, 
such correlation aggravates rather than solve Chalmers’ “hard problem”–how can 
a neuronal state be a state of consciousness? The question that arises is thus how to 
interpret such correlations. I will argue that this requires putting the brain in the 
body of an animal living in the world. Epistemologically, this amounts to putting 
neuroscience in the context of cognitive science (Varela’s concept of enaction) 
and cognitive science in the context of biology (Maturana and Varela’s concept of 
autopoïesis).
Keywords: neurophenomenology, enaction, autopoïesis, conscious experience, 
cognition, life, Varela
1. Introduction
In 1995, Chalmers [1] identified what he called the “hard problem” of conscious‑
ness. The question is, how can a purely physicochemical event such as a set of action 
potentials in a set of brain cells (and why brains, rather than the heart or the gut?!) 
actually be a subjective, conscious experience. Chalmers wrote: “Why is it that when 
our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information processing, we 
have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle 
C? … Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems 
objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.” Over 20 years later, we are 
hardly any nearer a solution; the problem remains entire.
In Section 2, I will present the “neurophenomenology” proposed by Varela [2], 
which provides empirical evidence on the neural correlates of consciousness. While 
entirely valid and indeed intriguing, this work does not solve the “hard problem”; 
I will argue that in a way it makes matters even worse, because the correlations it 
reveals are not explanatory, but they require explanation‑although in the conclu‑
sion, I will suggest that there is actually more to it than this.
In Section 3, I will present the concept of “enaction” [3]. In order for conscious 
experience to be possible, there must be something to be conscious of: “what is it 
like? …”, the question of qualia. Enaction is the process, whereby a living organism 
brings about or enacts its own characteristic lived world of experience. The clas‑
sic example is the “world of the tick” as evoked by von Uexküll [4], originally in 
1902, who provided a compelling view of “what it is like to be a tick.” An additional 
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feature is that whereas the original, prototypical example of enaction is the lived 
world of an animal, and this concept also applies to humans. And more specifically, 
this means that each and every one of the humans enacts our own lived world, every 
minute of every day of our lives. This introduces a note of first‑person subjectivity, 
which contrasts with the third‑person objectivity more usual in scientific discourse.
In the previous paragraph, I said that enaction is the process, whereby a living 
organism brings forth its lived world of experience. This raises the question as to 
whether being alive may not be a prerequisite for experiencing consciousness. There 
are two aspects to this: on the one hand, a “brain in a vat” would arguably not be 
properly conscious; on the other, it is only in science fiction that mechanical robots 
with computerized “brains” can be conscious. In order to deepen our understand‑
ing of what it takes to be fully alive, in Section 4, we will look at autopoïesis, the 
process whereby living organisms continually fabricate themselves. This is something 
that every living organism does, even a lowly bacterium; but a brain in a vat, just 
by itself without being part of an organism, does not; neither does any man‑made 
machine, not even the most powerful computer imaginable with or without a 
sophisticated connectionist architecture.
In the box below, I provide definitions of some major concepts in this field.
Finally, in conclusion, I will attempt to draw these various threads together.
2. Neurophenomenology
A notable attempt to solve the “hard problem”—or rather, to dissolve it away—is 
the neurophenomenology proposed by Varela [2]. There are two strands to neu‑
rophenomenology. On one hand, there are the modern techniques of brain imag‑
ing, which provide rich empirical data—fine‑grained, precisely localized, in real 
time—on cerebral activity. On the other hand, there is a serious attempt to obtain 
valid descriptions of first‑person subject consciousness. It is notoriously difficult to 
obtain such descriptions; spontaneous introspection is disconcertingly unreliable. 
In a well‑known experiment, repeated by various authors, two similar subjects are 
Definitions of major concepts
Enaction. Enaction is the process, whereby a living organism brings forth its own specific “lived world.” 
The prototype example is the “world of the tick,” as described by von Uexküll and detailed in the text. It is 
to be noted that “enaction” also applies to human beings, including each of us, ourselves, which introduces a 
dimension of first‑person subjectivity unusual in scientific discourse.
Autopoïesis. Autopoïesis is the process, whereby living organisms continually produce themselves. They 
are thus processes rather than things; they only become “things” again when they are dead. This feature 
differentiates the humblest living organism, even a bacterium, from the most sophisticated robot with 
a computer “brain,” since these robots do not produce themselves, they are made and repaired from the 
outside, by human engineers; in other words, they are heteropoïetic.
Dissipative structure. In thermodynamically open systems (qv), there can be spontaneous generation 
of dynamic dissipative structures, dynamic forms which are par excellence processes rather than things. 
Mundane examples are tornadoes or a whirlpool in a river. Living organisms belong to the class of dissipa‑
tive structures. However, whereas common examples such as whirlpools are essentially ephemeral, lasting 
only as long as special external conditions over which they have no controls maintained; living organisms 
are potentially immortal, having the capacity to perpetuate themselves indefinitely (see autopoïesis).
Thermodynamic systems: open and closed. In classical thermodynamics, there are two sorts of system. 
In a closed system, there are no exchanges with anything external to the system; it is in such systems that 
“entropy” (i.e. disorder) can be properly calculated and it demonstrably increases monotonically. In open 
systems, by contrast, there is a continual flow of energy and matter through the system. In this case, 
“entropy” cannot be properly calculated, and so no longer increases. In such systems, dynamic dissipative 
structures (qv) can arise spontaneously, and maintain themselves indefinitely.
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shown, but slightly with different portraits, and were asked to designate the one 
they prefer. They are then shown a slightly enlarged version of the portrait, other 
portrait, and asked to explain why they chose it. Blithely unaware of the subterfuge, 
the subjects dutifully spin a yarn explaining why they preferred the portrait they 
had not chosen. At a more basic level, when asked to describe their experience of 
a visual perception, naïve subjects base themselves on what they know, or think 
they know, about the object in question (an apple, a house, a dog…). It was in order 
to counter this tendency that Husserl [5], the founding father of phenomenology, 
developed the practice of “eidetic reduction,” that is, putting aside or bracketing out 
one’s knowledge of the object, in order to focus on the actual experience itself. This 
is not easy, but possible if due care is taken. In Varela’s own work, he employed an 
“interview method” to obtain reliable descriptions of subjective experience [6].
With these methods and also drawing on the literature, Varela obtained some 
convincing results. The major results are detailed in Table 1.
So where does this leave us? These neural correlates of consciousness are, in their 
own way, impressive indeed. However, with respect to the “hard problem,” there 
is a sense in which we are worse off than ever. The point is that these correlates are 
just that; they do not actually explain anything, and indeed they themselves require 
explanation. There is actually something more to Varela’s neurophenomenology 
than this, and I will return to this point in conclusion. However for the moment, we 
will now take a look at what might lie behind these correlations.
3. Enaction
To start with, it will be salutary to go back to basics and look at what it is that 
neurons actually do. Physiologically, their primary role is to connect sensory inputs 
to motor outputs. They are well suited to this task, since their basic mode of action 
is the action potential; and the cells of both sensory organs (eyes, ears, noses, tactile 
Attention. Three attentional networks contribute to distinguishing conscious from nonconscious cognitive 
events: orienting to sensory stimulation, activating patterns from memory, and maintaining an alert state.
Present-time consciousness. Phenomenological studies reveal a basic three‑part structure of the present, with 
threads into past and future horizons. These structural invariants link naturally to observations in cognitive 
neuroscience, which show that there is a minimal time required for the emergence of neural events that 
correlate to a cognitive event. This noncompressible time framework can be analyzed as a manifestation of 
the long‑range neuronal integration in the brain linked to a widespread synchrony.
Body image and voluntary motion. The nature of the will as expressed in the initiation of a voluntary action 
is inseparable from consciousness and its examination. Recent studies give an important role to neural 
correlates, which precede and prepare voluntary action, and the role of imagination in the constitution of a 
voluntary act.
Perceptual filling-in. This phenomenon involves the spontaneous completion of a percept, so that the 
appearance (i.e., a visual contour) is distinct from the physical correlate (incomplete borders, as in illusory 
contours). The neuronal data on filling‑in correlate well with the phenomenological observation: there is an 
important difference between “seeing as” (visual appearance) and “seeing what” (a visual judgment).
Fringe and center. In traditional phenomenology, there is a two‑part structure of the visual field between a 
“center” and a “fringe.” This correlates well with the structure of the retinal, between “foveal” area with a 
high density of retinal cells and a “peripheral” area with much lower density.
Emotion. In recent years, there have been significant advances in identifying the brain correlates of emotions. 
Evidence points to the importance of specific neuronal structures such as the amygdala, the lateralization of 
the processes involved, and on the role of arousal in emotional memory.
Table 1. 
Basic brain mechanisms for consciousness.
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receptors, etc.) and effector organs (principally muscles) also function with action 
potentials. It is thus quite convenient to connect receptor organs to neurons, and neu‑
rons to effector organs, by means of synapses. The point here is that by this means, 
the actual connections between sensory organs and effector organs is quite flexible: 
any sensory organs can be connected to any effector organ, and the connection can 
be excitatory or inhibitory depending on what is appropriate in terms of the sensory‑
motor dynamics thus set up. In order to appreciate the ecological significance of this, 
the time has come to introduce the notion of enaction, the process whereby a living 
organism enacts, or brings about, its own characteristic “lived world.”
The prototype example is the “world of the tick” as described by von Uexküll 
[4]. This lived world is enacted by three simple sensation‑action cycles. (i) The 
female tick climbs to the end of the branch of a bush, and … waits, maybe for 
weeks. If she senses an odor of butyric acid, she lets herself fall. (ii) If she falls on 
a hairy surface, she crawls until she finds a smooth area (if not, she climbs back 
up onto the bush and starts over). (iii) She then sticks her proboscis through the 
surface, and if she finds a liquid at 37°C underneath, she sucks to satiety. This 
makes sense when we know that (in context) butyric acid is secreted by the sweat 
glands of mammals; the hairy surface will then be the fur of the mammal; and 
the liquid at 37°C will be the blood of the mammal (which the tick needs to feed 
her eggs; she then fertilizes the eggs from a store of sperm, after which she lays 
the eggs and her life cycle is complete). Of course, the tick does not know that, 
as such; indeed, she is barely conscious. But the important point for us here is 
that these simple sensory motor dynamics are set up by the wiring of the tick’s 
simple peripheral nervous system. Note that this would not work if activation of 
the butyric acid sensors did anything other than triggering the motor action of 
letting herself fall; if the tactile sensors of a hairy versus smooth surface triggered 
anything other than crawling to a smooth surface, and sticking the proboscis 
through the surface; and if the temperature sensors of liquid at 37°C did not 
trigger the action of sucking. The example is magnificent; in this way, the tick, a 
tiny animal, which can only crawl slowly, manages the feat of catching a mammal 
far bigger and faster than herself, and not only that but getting to suck its blood. 
Thus, although the tick is barely conscious, the wiring of her nervous system 
is instrumental in setting up the meaningful lived world that she is minimally 
conscious of. This is indeed a basic point; Husserl noted that “consciousness” is 
always consciousness of, consciousness is always “intentional,” aiming at some‑
thing meaningful. So what we see here is that way before we get to the higher level 
consciousness experienced by humans, the nervous system is fundamental to 
setting up the whole situation.
Before moving on, there is another aspect to enaction; that is, as conscious living 
beings, each and every one of us enacts our own lived world, every minute of every 
day. This introduces a note of first‑person subjectivity that is unusual in scientific 
discourse; I will return to this point also in the conclusion.
4. Autopoïesis
I now address the point that consciousness would seem to be a feature reserved 
to living organisms; it is only in science fiction that computers and computerized 
robots are conscious (the film “Space Odyssey 2001” with the computer “Hal,” 
and the film “Her” in which the hero falls in love with his “operating system”). 
This raises the question as to what it is about living organisms that makes them 
candidates for consciousness. After all, computerized robots can perfectly have 
artificial nervous systems that set up their sensory motor dynamics. One lead is that 
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all living organisms, even the simplest, have the property that they are autopoïetic, 
that is, they are pure processes that are continually “making themselves”; and this is 
something that even the most powerful computer, or the most sophisticated robot 
with a “brain” having a connectionist architecture, even attempts to do. Living 
organisms are thermodynamically open systems, with a continuous flow of energy 
and matter, which are essential to their existence (a living organism only becomes a 
“thing” again when it is a dead corpse). In this respect, living organisms are similar 
to other “dissipative structures” such as cyclones, or eddy currents in a river; with 
the difference that they actively promote the conditions that will enable them to 
perdure, which cyclones and rivers do not. It is in order to do this that they engage 
actively with their environment, in the course of which they enact their lived 
worlds. So maybe this is why a “brain in a vat” would arguable not be conscious; it 
is a brain in a living animal, in the world, which appears as the seat of consciousness. 
Exactly why consciousness is reserved to living organisms is not entirely clear, and 
worthy of deeper study.
Ironically, it is not the most highly evolved forms of human consciousness that 
are the most mysterious; Jaynes [7] has provided a highly suggestive account of how 
sophisticated reflexive consciousness might have arisen through the “breakdown 
of the bicameral mind”. The “bicameral mind” in question is the sort of trance 
in which prophets (Old Testament) and heroes (Odyssey) “heard voices” telling 
them what to do. Nowadays, we call this “auditory hallucination” and shut up 
those concerned in a psychiatric asylum, whereas at that time, they were valued 
members of their communities. However, that may be, “hallucinations” are clearly 
the result of cerebral activity, as are dreams to which they are closely related. No; 
what is most mysterious is the basic form of “animal consciousness,” which seems 
not only to be all‑or‑nothing but also to increase gradually along the evolutionary 
scale from fish to reptiles to mammals. This correlates with brain size but once again, 
correlation is not cause; a correlation is not an explanation, but rather a feature, 
which remains to be explained. Discussions of a scientific approach to consciousness 
are sometimes compared to the question of vitalism; living organisms were long 
considered as mysterious. Optimistic objectivists now consider that the advances 
in biology have rendered vitalism a problem of the past; with the suggestion that 
if we just continue with enough good natural science, the same will happen for the 
question of consciousness. I would like to suggest that things may not be so entirely 
straightforward.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to return to some issues that I raised earlier. As we 
have seen, Varela’s “neurophenomenology” highlights some of the neural correlates 
of consciousness. But as I said, if this were all, it would aggravate rather than solv‑
ing Chalmers’ “hard problem.” But in fact it is not all. Varela’s main point—which 
may be well missed by those reading it as one more academic text—is that if we 
really wish to address the phenomenon of consciousness, we must be prepared to 
take into account the fact that it is a phenomenon that is only properly instantiated 
in the form of first-person subjectivity. And this means that if we wish to seriously 
engage with it, we cannot escape the necessity of ourselves bringing into play our 
own individual consciousness. Varela writes:
“One must take seriously the double challenge my proposal represents. First, it 
demands a re-learning and a mastery of the skill of phenomenological description. 
Second: a call for transforming the style and values of the research community itself.
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To the long-standing tradition of objectivist science this sounds anathema, and it 
is. But this is not a betrayal of science: it is a necessary extension and complement. 
Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is 
where the potential for transformation lies. It is also the key for the difficulties this 
position has found within the scientific community. It requires us to leave behind a 
certain image of how science is done, and to question a style of training in science 
which is part of the very fabric of our cultural identity”.
The consequence is that with respect to the “hard problem,” the nature of “hard” 
becomes reframed in two senses:
1. It is hard work to train and stabilize new methods to explore experience.
2. It is hard to change the habits of science in order for it to accept that new tools 
are needed for the transformation of what it means to conduct research on 
mind and for the training of succeeding generations.
Interestingly enough, a similar theme comes up with respect to the concept of 
enaction. As I have already indicated, there is potentially an existential dimension to 
enaction; scientists are after all human beings, as thus like all living organisms enact their 
lived world every minute of every day. Taking this personally, it means that I am actually 
responsible for the quality of what my enacted world leads me to experience. We are on 
dangerous ground here for “normal science”: science is supposed to aim at objectivity; 
and it is very widely supposed that attaining objectivity requires the elimination of 
subjectivity. But subjectivity, if it is assumed as such, is neither more nor less than first‑
person experience as lived from the inside; and we have just seen that precisely, which is 
at the core of enaction. In other words, enaction, if it is taken seriously in what I person‑
ally see as its core, poses a manifest threat to our normal functioning as scientists.
Of course what happens is that any “normal” scientist will seek to defuse this 
threat – both individually and as a community. I do hope I am not being pretentious 
or disdainful here; I think I understand too well what is going on, because I know the 
cost. But still I do want to stand my ground, to stand up, and be counted. I maintain 
that if enaction is defused, it is betrayed. I propose that we take a closer look at this.
One of the main ways—certainly not the only one—that enaction defused is by 
converting it into a much safer research program of what has been called “4E cogni‑
tion” [8]. The “4Es” are: embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted cognition. 
This is a smart move (if one is indeed trying to defuse enaction so as to get back into 
the comfort zone of “normal” science), for the following reason. Varela himself 
envisaged enaction as the framework for a possible paradigm in Cognitive Science, 
and others have attempted to follow up on this [3]. Now, in any such attempt, the 
notions that cognition is embodied, embedded (it is more usual to say “situated”), 
and extended undeniably play key roles. So as a proponent of “existential enac‑
tion,” I cannot protest against the association of enaction with the other three “Es.” 
However, what I can and do protest about is adding in “enacted” as an ancillary 
element at the end of the list. In my view, these three E’s are subservient to the over‑
riding theme of enaction. Mixing them up indiscriminately, in the way that is done 
by proponents of the “4Es,” leads to missing the wood for the trees.
To sum up, then, I would like to conclude by an invitation. As I have tried to explain, 
the neuroscience of consciousness potentially opens up a breach in our normal function‑
ing as scientists; it offers the opportunity for those so inclined to introduce a subjective, 
existential dimension into their work. Of course, one can bring a horse to the water, but 
one cannot force him to drink. This is particularly so here, where intimate personal atti‑
tudes are at stake. But I hope that I have done enough to make the invitation appealing.
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